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JURISPRUDENCE ON PROTECTION OF WEAKER PARTIES IN EUROPEAN CONTRACTS LAW
FROM A SWEDISH AND NORDIC PERSPECTIVE
RASMUS GOKSOR *
ABSTRACT
With European integration, the European Union Member States are experiencing
challenges to their national traditions; each Member State understands itself as particular and
entertains the view that it has a different power dynamic than the average Member State. The
creation of European contracts law is the source of one such challenge in that it is believed to
decrease protection of weaker parties in contracts law in numerous Member States. Given the
widespread assumption that contracts laws in the Nordic countries are characterized by welfare
considerations and paternal motives, the Nordic countries are seen as the most prominent
examples for which protection is believed to decrease. By considering Nordic contracts laws in
the context of globalizations of law and legal thought, this article identifies the historical reasons
and sources for this prevailing assumption and reconsiders the true impact of European
contracts law in the Nordic countries. Specifically, this article shows that the Nordic countries
have been able to postpone many legislative choices necessary for harmonization based on their
concerns over a decrease in protection for weaker parties and the prevailing assumption about
their welfare-laden laws; in doing so, the Nordic countries are acting to protect their national
traditions from the reach of European integration. In the end, this article argues that there is
ample room for the development of far-reaching consumer protective measures in European
contracts law.
INTRODUCTION
From the outside, European integration appears to proceed without complications; the
European Union (“EU”) recently joined ten new Member States, the European Community
(“EC”) is progressing toward adoption of a directive on services in the common market, and the
EC is soon to adopt a common reference framework on contracts law. 1 This article, however,

* S.J.D. Candidate at Duke Law School, LL.M. in American Law from Boston University School of Law, and Jur.
Kand. from Göteborgs Universitet. The article was written while a Visiting Researcher at the European Law
Research Center, Harvard Law School, during 2004-2006. I am very thankful for the support and feedback of
Daniela Caruso, Duncan Kennedy, Ulf Bernitz, Hugo Ahlberg, and Carlye Murphy. Errors are mine alone.
1
See European Commission, Enlargement, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2006);
European Commission, Proposal for a Directive on Services in the Internal Market, at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/services/services-dir/index_en.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2006); European
Commission, Towards a European Contracts Law, 157, at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/socio_economic_research/docs/FP6_synopsis_en.pdf (last visited
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probes the ongoing debate of harmonization of contracts law within the European Union, and
finds that European integration causes numerous disturbances to Member States’ legal systems
including, of particular concern for this article, the Nordic legal systems. 2 Instead of assigning
these disturbances to differences among the different Member States’ legal systems and legal
cultures, the analysis in this article looks at European integration through a framework of legal
theory, specifically, the concept that there is an ongoing globalization of law and legal thought. 3
This article shows how European integration represents the reception of this ongoing
globalization in the Nordic countries and, in doing so, traces the disturbances experienced in the
Nordic countries to a misreading of and resistance to the globalization.
When the EC first began harmonizing national law in the 1950s, harmonization efforts
concentrated predominantly on public law and thus left private law and public law distinct within
the harmonization process. 4 It was not until 1985 that the EC took the first steps toward

Oct. 20, 2006). With “EU,” I refer to the European Union as a whole, whereas “EC”—the European Community—
represents the area in which the EU has legislative powers.
2
The Nordic legal systems refer to the legal systems in the Nordic countries. Denmark, Finland, and Sweden all are
members of the EU. Although they are not members of the EU, Iceland and Norway also are included in this article
because the EU closely affects these nations through their membership in the European Free Trade Association and
the European Economic Area agreement. I should emphasize that my main source of knowledge is of Swedish
origin. Most examples concerning national provisions, case law, and politics in this article are Swedish. However, I
try to broaden my perspective to the group of Nordic countries as much as possible. Of course, in applying this
model to other Nordic countries, one runs the risk of over-generalizing. My knowledge of political events in those
countries is relatively limited and it is only as an outside spectator from which I draw my conclusions. Nevertheless,
with this caveat in mind, I argue that there are strong similarities in the Nordic countries and that they all are facing
similar challenges.
3
See Duncan Kennedy, Two Globalizations of Law & Legal Thought: 1850-1968, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 631, 638
(2003).
4
Private law describes horizontal law, law concerning civil parties’ interaction. For example, contracts, property,
and torts laws are private law. Public law refers to cases concerning vertical relationships, when citizens interact
legally with public institutions. In Sweden, the distinction between private law and public law dates back to 1789,
when King Gustav III created the Supreme Court and granted it jurisdiction over private law cases. An
administrative agency, “Rikets Allmänna Ärenders Beredning,” was left with jurisdiction over public law cases.
GÖRAN INGER, SVENSK RÄTTSHISTORIA, 155-56 (Malmö, Liber Ekonomi, 1997). The distinction later inspired the
continued development of two independent court systems in Sweden and Finland: administrative courts and general
courts. See ULF BERNITZ, EUROPEAN LAW IN SWEDEN: ITS IMPLEMENTATION AND ROLE IN MARKET AND CONSUMER
LAW, 18 (Stockholm, Juridiska fakulteten vid Stockholms universitet, 2002). Today administrative courts handle
cases concerning public law including, for example, tax law, social security law, and treatment of the mentally ill.
General courts, on the other hand, handle cases concerning horizontal relationships—criminal cases and cases
between private parties, i.e. private law. In contrast, Norway and Denmark each have a single court system. One
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harmonizing private law, and still today the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) remains reluctant
to expand the doctrine of direct effect horizontally. 5
In the 1990s, some scholars identified Member States’ ability to retain control over
private law as one of the main reasons for the success of European integration. 6 The scholars
pointed out that throughout the foundational phases of the integration project, which spanned
almost three decades, Member States remained in control of private law. During this period, the
true effects of European integration on the essence of domestic legal discourse were not
apparent. 7 Governments’ powers seemed intact at the core. 8 The picture is radically different
today. 9 The harmonization of private law is now openly on the agenda of EC institutions, and, to
the interest of this article, a European contracts law is in the making. 10
Throughout Europe, the pros and cons of a comprehensive European contracts law are
subjects of contemporary discourse. One important issue in the ongoing discussion is what
effects such a contracts law would have on Member States’ legal systems; so far, problems have

can distinguish, however, between public and private law in all of the Nordic countries. Historically, the
administrative courts have been more involved in applying EC law and referring cases to the ECJ. See Ulf Bernitz,
Sweden and the European Union: On Sweden’s Implementation and Application of European Law, 38 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 903, 923 (2001).
5
See infra note 291. The doctrine of “direct effect” gives unimplemented EC directives effect after the expiration of
the implementation deadline. Article 94 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (“TEC”) defines
directives as legislative acts adopted by the Council for the approximation of laws, regulations, or administrative
provisions. See Article 94, TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340)
[hereinafter TEC]. A directive is a flexible regulatory instrument that binds Member States to a particular goal but
leaves Member States to choose how to attain that goal. The direct effect doctrine only binds Member States as
public entities—so-called vertical direct effect. Private parties are not required to comply with directive norms that
the legislature has failed to implement—so-called horizontal direct effect. Horizontal direct effect has not been
established as a matter of EC law. See generally Daniela Caruso, The Missing View of the Cathedral: The Private
Law Paradigm of European Legal Integration, 3 EUR. L. J. 6, 25ff (March 1997); but cf. Report from the
Commission on the implementation of Council Directive 93/13/EEC (2000) 248, infra note 323, at 14 (In 1997, the
Spanish Supreme Court applied an unimplemented Directive to a case concerning private parties, and thereby took
the first steps introducing horizontal direct effect).
6
See Caruso, supra note 5, at 4.
7
See JOSEPH WEILER, THE TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE (New Haven, Yale Law Journal Co. 1991).
8
See id.
9
See Daniela Caruso, Private Law and Public Stakes in European Integration: The Case of Property, 10 EUR. L. J.
751 (2004).
10
See infra note 285.
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primarily been identified in connection with the diverse regimes of domestic contracts law
dealing with the protection of weaker parties. 11 Many scholars assign these problems to
differences in Member States’ legal systems and legal cultures. On the one hand, some Member
States think contracts law is best left alone, and these nations avoid regulating protection of
weaker parties. On the other hand, some Member States employ truly interventionist and
paternalist systems to contract relations. The scholars believe that harmonizing contracts law
decreases the protection of weaker parties provided for in the law—at least for those states that
historically have allowed for intervention. The Nordic countries are held out as the most
prominent example of countries for which protection is believed to decrease. Nordic contracts
laws feature many social considerations and provides for court intervention to protect weaker
parties—i.e., Nordic contracts laws contain numerous “welfarism” concerns, where welfarism
represents “rules and principles protecting the weaker party to a contract.” 12
However, there is reason to question whether harmonizing contracts law actually
decreases protection of weaker parties. In 2002, the ECJ decided the case Commission v.
Sweden. 13 The Commission brought the case before the Court because of Sweden’s nonimplementation—so the Commission argued—of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 14
Sweden had kept its regime providing for protection of weaker parties intact, making only
minimal changes to the relevant contracts law provisions. There are two intrinsic points to be

11

See generally id.; Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in
New Divergences, 61 M. L. REV. 11 (1998); Thomas Wilhelmsson, Varieties of Welfarism in European Contract
Law, 10 EUR. L. J. 712 (2004).
12
Thomas Wilhelmsson, The Philosophy of Welfarism and its Emergence in the Modern English Contract Law, in
BROWNSWORD, R., G. G. HOWELLS, WELFARISM IN CONTRACT LAW, 71 (Aldershot, Hants; Brookfield, Vt.,
Dartmouth et al. 1994) (In the first parts of the article, Wilhelmsson discusses different definitions of welfarism and
their application); see also Wilhelmsson, supra note 11.
13
Case C-478/99, Commission v. Kingdom of Sweden, 2002 E.C.R. I-04147 (1999).
14
Counsel Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29 (EC) available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31993L0013:EN:HTML [hereinafter Unfair Contract Terms
Directive].
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made here. First, the Swedish implementation of the Directive was part of a common Nordic
effort. 15 Second, the Directive only provided for a minimum level of protection of weaker
parties, leaving the Member States with the option of having stricter protection; one would
expect, therefore, the Directive to cause no changes to the progressive Nordic legal systems. 16
Although Sweden—and the Nordic countries—prevailed in the case, there is nonetheless strong
support for the Commission’s claim that the Nordic countries’ implementation did not meet the
level required by the Directive. Indisputably, Commission v. Sweden challenges the claim that
protection of weaker parties will decrease in the Nordic countries.
Consequently, differences between Member States’ legal systems and legal cultures are
not likely the cause of the problems experienced in connection with contracts law regimes
protecting weaker parties. An analysis of European integration through a framework of legal
theory thus is useful. Building upon Duncan Kennedy’s work on globalizations of law and legal
thought, 17 this article contrasts the historical development of Nordic contracts laws from the
nineteenth century onwards, with the reception of law and legal thought from the centers of legal
development. This description provides a national perspective where intervention in contracts
law increased over time. The prevailing understanding is that Nordic contracts laws are full of
paternalist motives, informalities, and social conceptualism. At the same time, the article offers
a global perspective in which the Nordic countries receive globalizations of law and legal
thought. 18 This analysis demonstrates how European integration represents part of the latest of
these globalizations, which encompasses economic and political formalism. 19 Economic
formalism embodies both an increased interest with freedom of contracts brought about by
15

See infra at note 343.
See infra at note 346.
17
Duncan Kennedy is a Professor at Harvard Law School, Cambridge, United States. See Kennedy, supra note 3.
18
See id.
19
See generally id.
16
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European contracts law and the creation of protection of human and property rights resulting
from the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“European Convention”) into law. 20 Political formalism, on the other hand, embodies
judicial supremacy and federalism introduced by means of the European Community Treaty and
the acquis communautaire. 21
It is against this background that this article proceeds to look at the consequences within
the Nordic legal systems of the ongoing globalization of law and legal thought. The
globalization causes numerous disturbances to the Nordic legal systems. With European
contracts law, the Nordic legislatures are ceding formal legislative powers to the EC legislature
and to federal and national courts, whereas Nordic courts must accept the ECJ as the supreme
norm creator and interpreter. Additionally, both the legislatures and the courts fear for the
uniqueness of the Nordic legal systems—its realist characteristics and discourses, its
informalities, and its high level of social conceptualism.
Because of these disturbances, Nordic legal institutions strive to preserve the Nordic legal
systems’ characteristics whenever they are incorporating EC law. Indeed, these disturbances are
the reason why, within Nordic legal debate, all arguments and claims originate from
presumptions that the Nordic legal systems represent informalities or intervention and that the
EU represents formalism or economic liberalism. More specifically, Nordic legal debate
perceives Nordic contracts laws to represent paternalistic intervention and European contracts
law to represent economic liberalism. For instance, depending on political biases, scholars
describe Nordic contracts laws in terms of, on the one hand, flexibility and redistribution and, on

20

See id.; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950 (ETS
No. 5), 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 1950 entered into force Sept. 3, 1953 [hereinafter European Convention].
21
See Kennedy, supra note 3; TEC, supra note 5. The acquis communautaire is the product of the body of treaties
and directives and their common interpretation by the ECJ.
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the other hand, informality and excessive intervention; and European contracts law in terms of,
on the one hand, legal certainty and efficiency and, on the other hand, stagnation and formalism.
This dichotomized set of presumptions about European contracts law, until now, has
mitigated the true impact of harmonization of contracts law in the Nordic countries and has
allowed postponement of the many legislative choices made necessary by the harmonization.
Part I of this article begins by presenting an analytic framework based on Kennedy’s
theory on globalization of law and legal thought, focusing on the three globalizations that have
occurred since the nineteenth century, their characteristics, and their principal contents. 22 In Part
II, this article gives a historical description of contracts law in the Nordic countries. The analytic
framework developed in Part I provides a global perspective. The Nordic countries are in receipt
of—and inspired by—the globalization movements at the core of legal development.
Part III analyzes the relevant EC legislation on contracts law—namely, the Unfair
Contract Terms Directive. 23 As the contours of European contracts law form, Part III discusses
its relation to Nordic contracts laws. The findings include differences in legislative techniques
and in legislative policy. Part III shows how European contracts law includes more formalist
clauses, grants more rights, and focuses policy more on information and individualism than
Nordic contracts laws. Part IV compares the Nordic and European contracts laws and explains
the effect of incorporating European contracts law into the Nordic legal systems. In particular,
Part IV studies Commission v. Sweden, decided by the ECJ in 2002, which brings to light the
conflicts between the Nordic legislatures and EC institutions, mainly the Commission and the
ECJ. 24

22

See Kennedy, supra note 3.
See Unfair Contract Terms Directive, supra note 14.
24
See Commission v. Sweden, supra note 13.
23
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In Part V, this article presents an alternative explanation of the problems of
harmonization of contracts law experienced in Nordic legal systems, connecting the historical
description of Nordic contracts laws, European contracts law, and European integration with the
theory of globalizations presented in Part I. In so doing, this article traces the disturbances
experienced in the Member States to the ongoing globalization. Furthermore, Part V shows how
Nordic legal debate works to mitigate the true impact and resist the implications of European
contracts law, and, finally, Part VI presents a conclusion based upon the findings in this article.
I.

GLOBALIZATIONS OF LEGAL THOUGHT

In his more recent works, Kennedy presents a theory about the globalization of law and
legal thought. 25 Kennedy identifies and tracks the developments of legal theory in the core,
analyzes how these developments globalize and, ultimately, describes the reception of these
developments in the periphery. Of importance to this article are the globalizations of Classical
Legal Thought, The Social, and the Third Globalization. 26
Classical Legal Thought is what Kennedy identifies as the first globalization, comprising
a combination of individualism and deduction. 27 More specifically, what globalized with
Classical Legal Thought was the idea that the legal system has a strongly coherent internal
structure—based on Friedrich Carl von Savigny’s (1779-1861) theories on legal systems—and
the will theory. 28

25

See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 637; see also Duncan Kennedy, The Rise & Fall of Classical Legal Thought
(AFAR, Cambridge, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) [hereinafter The Rise & Fall of
Classical Legal Thought).
26
See id.
27
The globalization of Classical Legal Thought stretched from the mid-nineteenth century until the end of the First
World War. See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 637; see also Kennedy, The Rise & Fall of Classical Legal Thought,
supra note 25.
28
See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 637.
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Savigny believed that normative orders are coherent systems, building upon the spirit and
history of a specific people. 29 According to him, positive legal rules can be created and derived
from a system’s internal coherence. 30 This produced a strong sense of tradition, authority, and
patriarchy. 31 Legal scientists and law professors were the main actors in the process of
constructing coherent systems. 32 In Germany, for example, followers of Savigny—the Historical
School—inspired the adoption of the German Civil Code of 1900. 33
The other notion of Classical Legal Thought, the will theory, tried to identify and derive
rules from the idea of individual self-realization. 34 Accordingly, governments should be
concerned with the rights of legal entities, allowing them freedom to realize their individual will
and intervening only to assure that others can do the same. 35
Kennedy identifies the emergence of a critique toward the inherent logic and deduction of
Classical Legal Thought to avoid a social crisis stemming from a few dominating the many. 36
Whereas the logic was “inherently individualist in legal substance,” it had limited reach—it
could not safeguard social concerns. 37 In the latter part of the nineteenth century, social reality
was at focus and the new socio-economic maxim of interdependence became predominant. 38
Everywhere in society, there were reminders of the countless examples of extreme outcomes and
inequalities stemming from Classical Legal Thought’s inability to regard the changing factors of

29

See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 638; see also INGER, supra note 4, at 165.
See id.
31
See INGER, supra note 4, at 165.
32
See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 638
33
See id.
34
See id.
35
See id.
36
See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 648. Rudolf von Jhering (1818-1892) played a major role in formulating this
critique, which globalized between 1900 and 1968. See id.; RUDOLPH VON JEHRING, THE STRUGGLE FOR LAW
(1879).
37
Kennedy, supra note 3, at 648 (quotations omitted).
38
See id. (interdependence represented a social transformation, comprising industrialization, globalization, and
urbanization).
30
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society. Industrial accidents, failing factories, and emerging urban slums all were attributed to
the will theory’s inability to respond to social needs. 39
The critique of Classical Legal Thought took the form of The Social.40 This does not
mean that the critique was necessarily Socialist; instead, The Social connotes a way of thinking
concerned with how to use law to achieve social objectives. 41 From describing the problem of
Classical Legal Thought and of what “is,” The Social continued and developed what “ought” to
exist. 42 Everything, from unfair contract practices, labor legislation, rent and housing laws, and
zoning to intervention in financial markets, was considered a legitimate purpose. 43 Within
general contracts law, The Social shifted the focus from the subjective intention, i.e. the free will
of the parties, to predefined objective functions in an effort to avoid unfair results. 44
Politically, The Social could take the form of Socialism, Nationalism, Authoritarianism,
or Fascism. 45 The Social was, however, always both anti-Marxist and anti-laissez-faire. 46
Whatever its political shape, The Social advocated the same language of “organicism, purpose,
function, reproduction, welfare, [and] instrumentalism.” 47
Most recently, and all around us, the Third Globalization exists. 48 What is globalizing is
not an all-new comprehensive legal theory, nor is it a synthesis from what was before. 49 Rather,
the Third Globalization is the “un-synthesized coexistence” of The Social and Classical Legal

39

See id. at 649.
See id. at 648. The Social is the term used by Kennedy in his scholarship to describe this era.
41
See id. at 633.
42
Id. at 650. Different organized interests as well as the public interest worked in harmony to maximize social
welfare, and the result was legal rules derived from “social needs or functions or purposes.” Kennedy, supra note 3,
at 653, 672.
43
See id. at 650.
44
See Fernanda Nicola, Asymmetry and Distribution in European Contract Law, 35 (S.J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law
School, 2004) (on file with the author).
45
See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 650.
46
See id. at 649.
47
Id. at 650.
48
See id. at 674.
49
See id.
40
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Thought. 50 Elements from those theories transformed or survived and now surround us. 51
Neither Classical Legal Thought nor The Social thus has ceased to exist.
In the way The Social stemmed from a critique of Classical Legal Thought, the Third
Globalization grew out of a critique of The Social. From the 1930s on, with a peak in 1968, the
critique has visualized the many problems of The Social. 52 Four main critiques exist.
First, The Social bases its is-to-ought constructions of legal rules on meta-physical
concepts. 53 One cannot derive rules from social needs, functions, or purposes, without denying
the invasive conflict between different functions. 54 Second, critics gave much attention to the
link between The Social and extreme political systems; Fascism is a prime example. 55 Third, the
critique that had the most impact addressed the lack of formalism in The Social as informalities
of The Social opened the way for governments to tangle with individual rights. 56 Arbitrariness
and authoritarian elements permeated government institutions and administration. 57 Finally,
there were many claims concerning social institutions’ tendency to damage the interests they
aimed to protect. 58 For instance, one claim was that redistribution of wealth from the middle
classes to the lower classes stagnated economic growth. 59 Another example was that people
received social protection that was worth less than the price increase the protective measures

50

Kennedy, supra note 3, at 674. Modeer draws a similar conclusion in his book, Historiska Rättskällor. He
recognizes the reemergence in Swedish jurisprudence of what he calls natural law as a consequence of European
influence in Sweden. KJELL A MODEER, HISTORISKA RÄTTSKÄLLOR: EN INTRODUKTION I RÄTTSHISTORIA, 236
(Stockholm, Nerenius & Santerus Förlag, 1997); Håkan Strömberg, Tankar om naturrättens renässans, I: Svensk
Juristtidning 1996, s. 635 ff.
51
See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 674.
52
See id. at 671.
53
See id. at 672.
54
See id.
55
See id.
56
See id. at 672-73.
57
See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 672-73.
58
See id. at 674.
59
See id.
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caused in the market. 60 This critique found that weaker parties would be better off without The
Social, social engineering, and state services.
As the critiques against The Social gained strength, the Third Globalization embraced
The Social, which had now transformed into policy analysis—also described as conflicting
considerations or balancing. 61 Policy analysis enabled courts to strike a balance between
different “interests,” “values,” and “utilities” that had a stake in the outcome. 62 In contrast to the
earlier mode, when rules had been created with a particular purpose in a coherent legal system,
policy analysis allowed creation of rules from ad hoc compromises. 63
Similarly, Classical Legal Thought formalism transformed into a new shape and reemerged as neo-formalism, 64 introducing human rights, contracts and property rights, federalism,
and judicial supremacy. 65 Rule of law limited the executive and legislative branches of
government through judicial supremacy, and courts grew to be the arbitrators. 66 Once again, it
was possible to deduce rights and rules from an imaginary coherent system of positive law, 67 the
best example of which was the emergence of the extensive and widely used regime of human
rights. 68

60

See id.
See id. at 671, 676. See also Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Rationality, or
Max Weber's Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L. J.
1031 (2004) (for more on policy analysis).
62
Kennedy, The Rise & Fall of Classical Legal Thought, supra note 25, at 251 (the point is that none of the different
criteria may be used to construct a principle; they are all choices between “natural rights/morality and social welfare
maximization.”).
63
See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 675.
64
See id. at 671, 676.
65
See id. at 634, 674.
66
See id. at 634. Both policy analysis and neo-formalism perceived the judge as the central figure. It is he or she
who makes the ad hoc compromises in each case and at the same time protects rights and formalities. See id. at 677.
67
See id. at 674.
68
See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 674-75.
61
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II.

PROTECTION OF WEAKER PARTIES IN NORDIC CONTRACTS LAWS

Nordic legal unity stems from the Nordic countries’ common legal theory and
methodology, because all Nordic countries share basic legal concepts, have alike legal sources,
and incorporate the doctrine of precedent. 69 Other notable characteristics are the many
sociological and political correspondences between the Nordic countries; they all share similar
“intentions, language and welfare.” 70
Most comparative studies perceive the Nordic legal systems as distinguishable from both
Civil and Common Law legal systems. 71 Zweigert and Kötz observe in their book, An
Introduction to Comparative Law, that Nordic law is “not completely civil – not common law.” 72
Although historically the Nordic legal systems have had close ties to the Civil Law tradition, one
can find general Common Law features in, for example, securities and property law, which
developed almost entirely by case law, analogies, and scholarship. 73
From a contracts law perspective, what characterize the Nordic legal systems are “the
lack in Nordic law of large, systematically constructed private law codifications” and the
frequent use of analogies when no applicable statutory law exists. 74
A.

Emerging Welfarism and Classical Legal Thought
The Nordic countries traditionally work together to find common legal solutions.

Cooperation takes place both on a formal and on an informal level, from private phone calls

69

See BERNITZ, supra note 4, at 97.
K. ZWEIGERT & H. KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW, 294-95 (Oxford New York, Clarendon Press,
Oxford University Press, 3d ed., 1998).
71
Recent comparative studies describe the Nordic legal systems as a sub group to the continental Civil Law legal
system. See BERNITZ, supra note 4, at 20 (citing MICHAEL BOGDAN, KOMPARATIV RÄTTSKUNSKAP, 91 (Stockholm,
Norstedts juridik, 1993).
72
ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 70, at 287.
73
See BERNITZ, supra note 4, at 17.
74
Ulf Bernitz, Nordic Legislature Cooperation in the New Europe, 39 SC. ST. L. 29, 32 (2000).
70
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between officials to public meetings. 75 Nordic cooperation dates back to 1872 when Nordic
lawyers and scholars gathered in a formal meeting to exchange ideas on legal issues. 76 Other
meetings followed and, in time, the meetings became institutionalized. 77
At first, efforts were concentrated on areas concerning trade law. 78 However,
cooperation has since expanded to areas such as family law, intellectual property law, and laws
of inheritance. 79 This has produced a number of essentially identical laws throughout the Nordic
countries; similarities exist both on a material level and in how the Nordic countries apply these
laws. Currently, the Nordic countries arrange “Meetings of Nordic Jurists” once every three
years. 80
In the context of contracts law, one can trace common Nordic features back to the early
twentieth century. Between 1905 and 1907, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark adopted common
acts on Sale of Goods. 81 At the time of enactment, the controlling law in Sweden was the Trade
Code from 1734, 82 which most critics held as outdated and insufficient. 83 In terms of regulating
contracts law, the Purchase and Exchange of Goods Acts changed little, and a significant
addendum to and improvement of the Purchase and Exchange of Goods Acts and of contracts

75
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law came with the new Contracts Acts. 84 Between 1915 and 1936, all Nordic countries adopted
the new Contracts Acts. 85 The Acts mostly were an effort to put into statute what already was
governing case law, but new aspects included honesty and fair dealing in contract relationships. 86
From a global perspective, Classical Legal Thought strongly influenced Nordic contracts
laws and the adoption of the Contract Acts. The Act represented the success of the will theory in
Nordic contracts laws, emphasizing the rights of legal entities and scientifically construed after
the positivist German model of “normative formalism.” 87 The Contracts Acts also were in step
with the general laissez-faire tendencies of society. 88
Central to the Contracts Acts was the principle of freedom of contract. For instance,
section 1, paragraph 1, of the Swedish version of the Contracts Act made offers to contract
binding. 89 The contracting parties decided the extent of their contractual relationship through
offer and acceptance, and the Government upheld their will to contract as long as it could
identify a formal offer to contract—the promise made by the offeror was one that the
Government thought should be enforceable. 90
Moreover, section 1, paragraph 2, of the Contracts Act established that when commercial
practices or a practice between the involved parties entail a custom that the parties and the courts
regard as binding on the parties, that custom should have precedence over formal requirements in
84
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the Act. 91 Of course, an explicit agreement between the parties also would have precedence. 92
Freedom of contract thus was negatively legislated; it was the underlying presumption. 93 The
law allowed parties to develop their own norms through trade practice, and courts upheld those
norms. 94
Another example of the importance of the will theory in Nordic law can be found outside
the Contract Acts. Sweden has strongly relied on the principle of extinction. According to that
principle, restated in among others the Promissory Notes Act (1936), a buyer who purchases
stolen property in good faith prevails over the original owner by extinguishing the original
owner’s right to the property. 95 The idea is that good faith buyers should be able to rely on the
enforceability of a contract to buy property, thereby increasing willingness to contract. Only in
July 2003 did the Swedish legislature change this rule toward the prevailing principle elsewhere
in the EU, which holds that the original owner’s right prevails over a good faith buyer’s right. 96
In sum, the Nordic legislatures sought different ways to retain a very high degree of contractual
freedom and to avoid interfering in market transactions.
Classical Legal Thought also had an impact on how to provide for protection of weaker
parties; the Contract Acts limited intervention in contract relationships to the securing of each
entity’s individual will through regulating the form and procedure, rather than the substance, of
contract formation. 97 When the Acts allowed for intervention in substance, specifically section
33 of the Act, it limited intervention to invalidating contracts “contrary to good faith and
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honesty.” 98 Accordingly, a contracting party had no obligation to take into consideration the
other party’s will. This image assumed that all contracting parties had equal social and economic
power and, therefore, that parties could look after their own interests. 99 The widespread use of
the caveat emptor principle strengthened the presumption that contracting parties were informed
and rational actors. 100
In sum, contracts law from this period was shaped by the perception that the market was
best left alone. Consequently, the Contract Acts contained no specific welfarist goals, only a
mutually recognized respect of each party’s will and a limited call for morality in the market. 101
Thomas Wilhelmsson, Professor at Helsinki University in Finland, categorizes the welfarist
provisions in the Contract Acts as representing an “emerging welfarism.” 102
B.

The Civil Code Discussion
Both the French and German civil codes greatly inspired Nordic countries throughout the

nineteenth century, and Sweden entertained the option of adopting a civil code in the early
nineteenth century, when the French adopted their Code Civil. 103 In fact, the Government’s
working committee presented a draft, Civillagsförslaget, in 1826. 104 Critics, mainly
conservatives, opined that a civil code would be “unduly radical.” 105 Following Savigny, they
argued that codification would upset the history and tradition of the people. 106 The Supreme
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Court, at the time charged with the responsibility of reviewing proposed laws, dismissed the code
in 1833 107 and, hence, the code was never presented to the Parliament for voting. 108 No Nordic
country adopted a civil code, choosing instead to focus legislative efforts on particular legal
sectors and the use of analogy when no applicable rule exists. 109 The Nordic Contract Acts only
consisted of around thirty sections. 110
C.

Reactive Welfarism and The Social
At the end of the nineteenth century and in the early twentieth century, governments all

over the world experienced increasing numbers of market failures and, like in many other places,
governments in the Nordic countries looked to activist state action in the form of reconstruction
programs as a counter measure. Otto von Bismarck’s German welfare model especially
influenced the establishment of Nordic welfare states. 111
Inspired by its German counterpart, social democracy grew as a political force; it was a
movement to reform society through democratic rather than revolutionary means. 112 Large parts
of the growing working class were excluded, however, from democratic influence, because of
restrictions that based voting rights on gender and property. 113 As a result, in Sweden, the period
107
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between 1880 and 1909 can be described in terms of class conflict, characterized by demands for
increased democracy against the conservative regime. 114 Only in the 1910s did Sweden see
change and social democrats were able to establish themselves in the parliamentary system. All
the Nordic countries experienced the emergence of welfare states.
The Swedish welfare state was characterized by the introduction of “Folkhemmet” or the
“Common people’s home.” 115 This concept was of German origin and stood for the idea that the
state should look after and take care of its citizens. 116 In the words of former Swedish Prime
Minister Per Albin Hansson (1885-1946):
A good home knows of no privileged or suppressed, and of no favorites or
stepchildren. No one looks down on others, and no one tries to gain advantages
from others’ weaknesses, the strong do not repress or loot the weak. In a good
society, there is equality, care, co-operation, and willingness to help. 117
Tax revenue allowed the government to fund increased pensions, health insurance,
accident insurance, disability and retirement insurances, unemployment insurance,
unemployment boards, and favorable loans for housing. 118 Social democrats also enacted new
Family Codes, regulating everything from marriage to the parameters for government
intervention in a family to take custody of children. 119 It was an attempt to reach harmony on all
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levels in the labor market, in the family, and between state and civil society. 120 In this process,
all Nordic countries centralized state power and applied large-scale solutions. 121 With time, the
distinction between state and civil society eroded. 122
As a parallel to—and tied to—the social democratic parties’ increased political influence,
the Nordic countries experienced the globalization of The Social. One original and expounding
example of The Social’s impact on Nordic legal theory is the development of labor law, which
contains many corporatist features and which historically has been heavily regulated and more or
less completely isolated from general contracts law. 123
Labor law was among the first areas in which the legislature intervened to preempt
inequalities. 124 This occurred, for example, in the early twentieth century, when legislation
forced employers to include social insurance for industrial accidents in wage bargaining. 125 In
addition, the legislature enacted statutes addressing labor accidents and protection against
evictions during labor conflicts. 126 Nevertheless, workers, employers, and the government still
divided the labor market. A process of cooperation started when the forces of the labor market
settled. In Sweden, this happened in 1938, when unions entered into a collective bargain with
employers, the so-called “Saltsjöbadsavtalet.” 127 Both sides understood that in order to avoid a
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collapse of production, they had to work together. Strife and class war were outdated because
they ignored the inherent interdependence between labor and capital; in other words, society
needed to find harmony. 128 Together, unions and employers entered into collective agreements,
disregarding individual and formal criteria of contract making by binding non-union members
and, thus, marginalizing the will theory. 129 Moreover, labor and management councils were
vested with the power to make legally binding regulations. 130
This marked the start of a lasting period of consensus and détente in the Swedish labor
market. The Swedish legislature allowed the parties in the labor market to develop their own
solutions, as long as those solutions produced results. A comprehensive regime of corporatism
grew out of this close cooperation between unions and employers. It was not until the 1970s that
the unions started demanding legislative intervention in order to force development. 131 Sweden
has not, to date, enacted any legislation providing for minimum wage, leaving it to the unions
and the employers to agree. Employer duties, contained in labor contracts growing out of this
period, included retirement benefits, paternity leave, and employment insurances. 132
Whereas labor law was heavily regulated and developed progressive solutions to socioeconomic problems, mainstream contracts law was left untouched. Intervention was limited to
specific cases where abuse of weaker parties occurred. One can identify two dominant trends
from a welfarism perspective. Case law expanded the reach of court intervention and the
legislatures took action in casu against specific market malfunctions.
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Through case law, the courts broadened welfarism and increased intervention in contract
relations. As a first step, courts came to use section 33 of the Contract Acts to establish a general
“duty of disclosure.” 133 In Finland, the leading Supreme Court case came in 1949, concerning
information about the condition of a machine for sale.134 The same year the Swedish Supreme
Court ruled that a duty exists to inform contracting parties about surprising and onerous
conditions in contracts. 135 That case concerned an arbitration clause that was integrated into a
contract through reference to a standard contract. 136
Courts also developed a general right and power to adjust unfair contract terms. 137
Several cases established this right to modify or set aside obviously unfair terms. 138 After a long
discussion in Finland that persisted well into the 1950s, scholars started to agree that by
analogizing to the unfairness clause in section 8 of the Promissory Notes Act, 139 one could
recognize a general principle of adjustment of “manifestly unfair contracts.” 140 In Sweden, the
Supreme Court decided the leading case, Köksmåla, 141 in 1948, where a lease made by the
Swedish Forest Council was found to contain unfair terms. 142
For their part, the Nordic legislatures introduced several mandatory laws as reactions to
the existing conditions of the relevant markets. To help develop urban areas, renting of
dwellings and leasing were regulated; for example, Finland passed a Land Lease Act in 1902 and
a Rent Act in 1925. 143 The legislatures adopted Insurance Contracts Acts in response to the
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unhealthy insurance practices that were widespread in the 1920s. 144 Additionally, regulations
addressed disclosure practices, double insurances, and time limitations. 145 A Promissory Note
Act also was adopted in Sweden in 1936 and in Finland in 1947. 146
Because the core of contracts law was left untouched and because attempts to limit
freedom of contract were seen as reactions to problems, Wilhelmsson describes these mandatory
rules as “reactive welfarism.” 147
D.

Particulars of The Social in the Nordic Countries
The unique characteristics that led the Social to develop a bias for social democracy and

mixed market economies in the Nordic countries are hard to identify. Where continental
European countries saw the emergence of Fascist regimes, the Nordic countries prospered in
social welfare democracy. This may well have been largely accidental; at least Sven Eliaeson
observes that no real reason exists for why Sweden only got the good out of what could have
been so bad. 148 His analysis is, to some extent, also true for the other Nordic countries.
First, Eliaeson identifies that the Swedish system is a system of class compromise:
“Socialized consumption and monopoly capitalism . . . [exist in] consensual cooperation, with a
high degree of involvement of organized interests . . . .” 149 There are many examples of
successful corporatist solutions and egalitarian ambitions. 150 Second, no real checks and
balances exist in the Swedish Constitution. Sweden has no tradition of judicial review and,
hence, no Constitutional Court. 151 In fact, the distinction between constitutional order and
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democracy is relatively absent. 152 The Swedish democracy is extremely monistic and unfit for
countries like Belgium, Germany, or Bosnia, Eliaeson believes. 153 Finally, Sweden’s
authoritarian and top-down system is built from comprehensive social engineering. 154 Swedes
are ignorant of the dangers of “Rousseauan populism.” 155 Rousseau understood democracy to
have totalitarian elements and, at least to some extent, to conflict with the notion of liberty. 156
The early twentieth century also saw the emergence of Scandinavian Realism. At the
time American Realism was evolving in the United States, Scandinavian scholars undertook a
similar project. 157 Scandinavian Realism was a reaction to legal science and its undemocratic
effects. 158 Throughout history, the Nordic countries have been autocratic and conservative, with
weak liberal traditions. 159 Society was very hierarchical and the aristocracy exercised great
power. 160 Even in the latter part of the nineteenth century, and for a long time thereafter, strong
conservative biases existed. 161 The Nordic countries had a democratic deficit.
Both Classical Legal Thought and The Social maintained that existing legal norms were
real and unchangeable. 162 Deduction from history, and reconstruction through deduction of what
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ought to be, worked as justificatory concepts. 163 From their emergence in the first part of the
twentieth century, Scandinavian Realists showed how this approach to law actually gave legal
science a conservative purpose and effect. 164 The Realists established that Classical Legal
Thought and The Social both involved elements of abuse of deduction. 165 Legal concepts such
as Right and Force were impossible to define in specific cases and the result was powerful; legal
concepts were not scientific, but they were under human control. 166 The method used by
Scandinavian Realists to achieve democratization was legal positivism. By removing the
unscientific parts of legal science, scholars and judges’ sphere of power over legal science
decreased. 167 This shifted legal decision-making powers from legal scientists and judges to the
popularly elected legislatures. 168 As a result, elected politicians could gain power and take
control of legal politics. 169
E.

Maturing Welfarism and The Third Globalization
The Third Globalization can be used to explain current legal developments in the Nordic

countries. While the reception of the Third Globalization at the periphery, which includes the
Nordic countries, is still underway, the Third Globalization links legal, political, and economic
events to a historical process. In so doing, it provides for important insights about the changes
and conflicts of Nordic legal theory.
A first observation concerning the reception of the Third Globalization in the Nordic
countries is that it has been asymmetrical. Whereas policy analysis has received much attention
and caused a progressive development, neo-formalism has met strong resistance.
163
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Policy analysis made its entry in the early 1970s, and had wide impact. Rules had
allowed for court intervention “in an all-or-nothing fashion.” 170 Rules conferred on courts either
the power to intervene or no power to intervene. As legislation through principles became more
frequent, courts’ powers expanded. Yet, in case law, courts continued to show reluctance toward
making active use of principles. This was true in the case of principles or general clauses in
contracts law. It was not until the 1970s, when legislation introduced general clauses that were
more powerful, that there was a major shift and courts’ power to intervene became real. 171
Principles providing for balancing appeared throughout the legal systems; in Sweden and
Finland, legislation through principles appears under the name framework laws or elastic
norms. 172 This development cleared the way for decisions of ad hoc compromises, which give
relevance to circumstances in casu. 173
From the perspective of contracts law, the most significant development in policy
analysis perhaps came in 1975. After a common Nordic effort to renew legislation, there were
three important developments: a principle of general consumer protection, a principle on
adjustment of unfair contracts, and a clear goal to “secur[e] the real functioning of protective
measures.” 174 Legislation provided for an assessment procedure of what is most fair in each
individual case and, consequently, delegated power to intervene to change the contract in line
with that assessment. This was the next major step in welfarist contracts law: “maturing
welfarism.” 175 Wilhelmsson characterizes maturing welfarism as a utilitarian consideration, a
system providing for a maximum amount of protection in each individual case. 176 The general
170
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clause of the Contract Acts, common section 36 (“Section 36”), combines all these features. 177
All Nordic countries adopted Section 36 with some variances. The Swedish version reads:
A contract term may be adjusted or held unenforceable if the term is unreasonable
with respect to the contract’s content, circumstances at the formation of the
contract, subsequent events, or other circumstances. If the term is of such
significance that it shall otherwise be unenforceable in accordance with its
original terms, the contract may also be adjusted in other respects or held
unenforceable in its entirety.
With respect to the application of the first paragraph, special consideration shall
be given to the need for the protection of consumers and others who assume an
inferior position in the contract relationship.
The first and second paragraphs shall be given similar application to terms in
other legal relationships than that of contract. 178
With the introduction of Section 36, courts increasingly used their powers to intervene in
contracts cases. 179 This intervention had been the legislatures’ intent; the Finnish legislature, for
instance, articulated the goal to “increase the willingness of the courts to adjust unfair contracts .
. . ” in the preparatory works to Section 36. 180 In addition, the Swedish version of Section 36
necessitated consideration of “the need for protection of consumers and others who assume an
inferior position . . . .” 181 The increased intervention led to the establishment of a supplementary
judge-made body of interpretative rules, a development best embodied in today’s strong legal
principle in Nordic contracts laws of allowing for court interference in contractual relations. 182
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More specifically, Section 36 expanded the criteria to consider when establishing whether
a contract was valid. Courts were no longer limited to considering only the formalities of
contract formation. Preparatory works, case law, and market practice laid out the idea that a
contract’s validity was dependent on substantive considerations. 183 To determine validity, courts
were required to examine what a contract materially incorporated. 184 A contracting party’s
personal relationships and social status could affect the outcome of a case. 185 In practice, Nordic
courts increasingly chose to intervene, and consumers and small businesses were more likely to
receive relief. 186 In Ulf Bernitz’s words: “The courts have been given considerable freedom of
action in handling this sanction, and in case law, the courts have often used adjustment to alter
unfair features of contract terms so as to be able to assess them as fair.” 187
Recent contributions to the evolution of policy analysis and contracts law include some
degree of “person related need-rational welfarism.” 188 The focus of review has shifted and is
now set on the material substance of the contract, making the judging principle each party’s
economic and social position and need. 189 The rules establish, for example, “social force
majeure” of a party as a cause for paternalistic intervention.190 There are several examples of
such tendencies in Swedish statutory law, including section 8 of the Interest Act, section 2 in
chapter 6 of the Torts Act, section 32 of the Consumer Credit Act, and section 25 of the
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Consumer Insurance Act. 191 Moreover, preparatory works contain many guidelines for courts on
what policy concerns and what social problems to consider when applying relevant legislation.
Case law has further established that social problems may sometimes be cause to limit liability
for a weaker party. 192 Even some standard contracts contain clauses accepting severe illness or
other similar circumstances as a reason to escape contract liability. 193
There were many other progressive developments in Nordic contracts laws in addition to
policy analysis. Sweden adopted a Consumer Services Act in 1985, 194 providing far-reaching
protection for purchasers of services. 195 In Finland, the government has created a Legal
Committee with representatives from both industry and commerce. 196 When asked, the
Committee gives reasoned opinions on unfairness of contract terms. 197
Additionally, policy analysis reception through EC law and the incorporation of
European Convention included a widening of national courts’ ability to adjudicate on general
principles of law. 198 For example, Sweden has recognized the proportionality principle and the
Supreme Court established its universal reach in 1995. 199 The Supreme Administrative Court
also has applied the principle of proportionality in a number of cases 200 concerning restrictions
on owners’ use of real property. 201
Distinct from the enthusiastic reception of policy analysis, the Nordic countries have
demonstrated great reluctance toward neo-formalism, the second part of the Third Globalization.
191

See id. at 464-66.
See id. at 468-69; MD [Market Court], 1979:3 (Sweden).
193
See Sandgren, supra note 97, at 469 (citing J. Bärlund, Sociala Prestationshinder i Konsumentavtal, NAK-rapport
1990:6, Nordiskt Ministerråd, Nord 1990:49, Köpenhamn: Nordiskt Ministerråd 1990, 44-77).
194
Konsumenttjänstlag [Consumer Services Act], SFS 1985:716 (Sweden).
195
See BERNITZ, supra note 4, at 8.
196
See id. at 272.
197
See id.
198
See BERNITZ, supra note 4, at 5; see also European Convention, supra note 20.
199
See BERNITZ, supra note 4, at 45.
200
See id.
201
See id.
192

6 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L 212 (2006).

Only with the help of political neo-liberalism and globalization, and only when framed in terms
of economic necessity, was neo-formalism able to gain influence in the Nordic legal systems:
European integration allowed judicial supremacy and human rights to establish themselves.
However, as the later parts of this article will show, the reception of neo-formalism to this day is
incomplete and contested.
Like other welfare states, the Nordic countries depend on free trade and the abolishment
of trade barriers for their survival. Their wealth is directly proportional to their trade, and they
all rely on a competitive and strong industry to pay for welfare expenses and to keep their
economies vital. Acting on this presumption, in 1960, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark were
among the founding fathers of the European Free Trade Association (“EFTA”). 202 Finland
joined the EFTA as an associate member in 1961 and Iceland joined in 1970. 203 Whereas EFTA
provided the Nordic countries with the benefit of free trade areas, it did not come without
stipulations. In particular, the EFTA required deregulatory measures and privatizations in the
market. This started a trend in the 1970s, in the aftermath of the Oil Crisis, which led to
increased dismantling and privatizing of welfare services in the Nordic countries. 204
At about the same time, political neo-liberalism evolved as a legitimizing factor to the
deregulatory movement. Neo-liberals promoted market independence in relation to the state. 205
They claimed that the model of increasing governmental expenditures, as proposed by John
Maynard Keynes (1883-1946), was incapable of addressing economic recessions.206 One
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example put forward by neo-liberals was the failure of national economies to handle the Oil
Crisis.
In Sweden, the single most significant event influenced by the neo-liberal movement may
have been the deregulation of the credit market, sometimes referred to as the “November
Revolution.” 207 On November 21, 1985, the National Bank deregulated the Swedish credit
market. 208 The Government stated that this measure was a natural part of the ongoing
modernization of economic politics. 209 Previously, the Government had actively directed and
controlled banks’ profits and risk taking. 210 Swedish National Economist Lars Jonung describes
the event as the most far-reaching reorganization of the National Bank’s currency policy in postWorld War II Sweden, 211 and Kjell Olof Feldt, the Swedish Treasurer at the time, believes that
with this decision Sweden gave up one of the most symbolic means for sheltering the economy
from undesirable market forces. 212 From a social democratic perspective, this deregulation was a
great defeat to neo-liberal ideology. 213
Another area affected by neo-liberalism and global free trade was the currency market.
The Nordic countries could no longer defend the value of their currency and, at the same time,
retain and develop a competitive industry. Eventually, all the Nordic countries had to switch to
floating exchange rates. 214
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Neo-liberalism also provided for a way to privatize social welfare. 215 For instance, until
the 1980s, Sweden provided for health care as part of social services. One could describe the
system in terms of doctors supplying a state service from which patients needing care and help
benefited. With neo-liberalism, the perspectives shifted. Patients became consumers who were
now buying a service; through elected representatives in parliament, the patients ordered the
health care. 216 This implied certain rights for the patient-consumer and certain duties for health
care providers. In addition, efficiency became an important concept in heath care services. 217
Another example of privatized welfare includes the trend to contract out public services. Where
the Government earlier had owned the companies that provided services, now, through public
bidding, private companies bid to provide the service for a given price. Public transportation,
health care, and day care all were contracted out.
Ultimately, during the 1980s, joining forces with the EU, either as member states or
through closer cooperation, became necessary for all the Nordic countries. 218 The EU had
become a solution to economic difficulties. In its EU application in July 1991, Sweden named
economic reasons as the decisive factor in its decision to join the EU. 219 “It is determinative for
Sweden’s economic strength and welfare that Sweden can continue to take part of Western
European integration,” the Government explained to the Parliament in its proposition concerning
the EU application. 220 At the time, after years of changing economic conditions, Sweden was in
the midst of its worst economic crisis in modern history. Today, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland
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are members of the EU, and both Iceland and Norway work closely with the EU through the
EFTA and the European Economic Area (“EEA”) agreement. 221
With the EU, neo-formalism made its entry into the Nordic legal systems. For Denmark,
this process came about much earlier than in the other Nordic countries because Denmark had
been a member of the EU since 1973. 222
The most obvious neo-formalist development resulting from the EU membership was the
reception of judicial supremacy. As part of becoming members of the EU, Member States are
subject to the quasi-federal judiciary, in the form of the ECJ. 223 For the EEA states, Norway and
Iceland, the EFTA Court has a similar role.224
The ECJ has jurisdiction to interpret EU treaties and EC legislation. 225 The ECJ handles
cases in two primary areas. One, the ECJ continuously checks Member State compliance to EC
law. 226 Two, the ECJ ensures that all Member States apply EC law in a uniform manner. 227
Cases decided by the ECJ thus take precedence over decisions by Member State courts. 228 The
ECJ may hear cases with EC institutions, Member States, companies, and individuals as parties.
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Member States also must accept and incorporate the acquis communautaire, the body of
legal rules developed with the EU. The EU treaties and the accessions treaties regulate how to
apply the acquis communautaire. 229 There exists, however, a general obligation to apply and
implement EC law effectively and a duty for courts to interpret and apply national law in
compliance with EC law. 230 The principle of interpretation in EC law should guide, and be the
basis for, Member State court decisions. 231
With the incorporation of the acquis communautaire, judicial review increased in the
Nordic countries. Courts must give EC law precedence over a conflicting national provision; it
follows logically since the national “provision is decided by an instance[, the Member State
legislature] no longer has the competence to decide the norm.” 232 This is a clear development
from the earlier prevailing model that included limited judicial review. Under the Swedish
Constitution, courts have the power to disregard unconstitutional provisions enacted by the
Parliament or the Cabinet only if that provision is manifestly in conflict with the Constitution.233
Swedish courts, therefore, have greater powers of judicial review when applying EC law; where
EC law is silent and national law governs, however, limited judicial review remains. 234
Two leading Swedish cases recognizing EC law supremacy have been decided by the
Supreme Administrative Court. In the 1997 case Lassagård, the Court established that where
Swedish law conflicts with EC law, Swedish law should be set aside. 235 The next case,
Upplands Lokaltrafik, found that national provisions inconsistent with an EC Directive are
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void. 236 The Court directly referred to ECJ case law, 237 such as Van Gend en Loos 238 and
Simmenthal. 239
Another development in the Nordic legal systems stemming from European integration
involves human rights. Sweden incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (“European Convention”) in January 1995. 240 Finland incorporated the
European Convention in 1990, Denmark in 1992, and Norway in 1999. 241 The Convention
enumerates several fundamental rights and freedoms. Parties to the treaty bind themselves to
secure the enjoyment of these rights and freedoms within their jurisdiction. Moreover, the
European Convention establishes a European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”). 242 The Court
has jurisdiction over cases concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention, and
the Court has developed an extensive case law over the years. 243
Bernitz suggests that, together, these developments have increased judicial protection for
individuals in Sweden. 244 In this sense, Constitutional Law has become more vital. As Bernitz
states, “the accession to the EU can be said to have upgraded the role of the law in Sweden and
the importance of the judiciary.” 245
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F.

Two Notes on the Third Globalization
Two aspects about the Nordic reception of the Third Globalization are striking. Both

have to do with the legislatures and, thus, the social welfare policies of all the Nordic countries.
First, one can attribute the legislatures’ thorough incorporation of policy analysis to the special
legal status of preparatory works in the Nordic legal systems. Second, the Nordic legislatures
have actively resisted the increased importance of rights in the Nordic legal systems.
As described above, policy analysis was the first part of the Third Globalization in the
Nordic countries. 246 Policy analysis was what transformed from The Social receiving swift and
straightforward implementation. The legislatures saw many advantages to policy analysis—
general clauses in the context of contracts law. Earlier attempts to intervene in the market had
been both over- and under-inclusive and sometimes produced awkward results. 247 With policy
analysis, intervention could be more pragmatic and on a case-to-case basis. 248 Policy analysis
became progressive law-making to the Nordic countries.
Perhaps the main reason why the reception of policy analysis came so easily to the
Nordic countries was that the legislatures believed they could control the outcome of policy
analysis in case deliberation through preparatory works. For instance, through general clauses
the legislature delegated broad powers. Section 36 of the Contract Acts was no exception.
Under Section 36, courts had the power to intervene if a party to a case showed a weakness
leading to an unbalanced contract. 249 For the Nordic legislatures, an important concern about
delegating power to the courts was how to safeguard effective protection of weaker parties and
how thus to attain a social welfare outcome. Put differently, there were no guarantees for what
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courts would do with their broad powers. Legislative delegation had to be conditioned, and
preparatory works played an important role.
Preparatory works are a primary legal source in the Nordic legal systems. They include
guidelines and explanations for laws as well as concrete and specific examples of adjudicative
outcomes. In his book, Avtalsrätt, 250 Lars Erik Taxell describes the use of preparatory works in
the Nordic legal systems:
Even a very specified and detailed legal norm will be applied to practical
situations that differ greatly from each other—this is a consequence of the
increased complexity of economic life. Therefore, when applying or interpreting
legal norms, a judge needs support of principles and the norms’ underlying goals.
Preparatory works and, therein, reiterated legislative comments consequently
integrate with a norm’s binding effect. Preparatory works highlight, materialize
and explain legal norms and thus provide tools to help their legal application. The
clearer and more detailed the legislative comments are, the stronger the
legislatures’ influence over legal application. 251
The Swedish preparatory works to Section 36 of the Contract Acts contain numerous
examples of how and when to apply the general clause.252 They illustrate various market
situations and contract terms, analyzed and evaluated from the standpoint of unfairness. 253 For
instance, the works include example contract terms that give a stronger contracting party
discretion to act, examples demonstrating where a party is discriminated against, and examples
where a party reserves the right to decide on a particular issue. 254
The Bergman & Beving case illustrates how the courts relate to the preparatory works to
Section 36. 255 In that case, concerning a contract between a small business and a larger
corporation, the Swedish Supreme Court stated:
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Whether . . . [in a case, a small business is in an inferior position,] depend[s] . . .
on the overall judgment of the contract situation which according to various
statements in the travaux preparatoires [(preparatory works)] to . . . [Section 36]
of the Contract Acts ought to be the basis for determining whether or not a
contract term is to be regarded as unfair. 256
In sum, the special status of preparatory works in Nordic legal systems proved to be a
useful tool for the legislatures when legislating with general clauses. Indirectly, social policies
expressed in the preparatory works supplemented general clauses and, thus, allowed the
legislatures to set up frameworks for court balancing. Contracts law deliberation could thereby
entertain balancing between conflicting policies such as freedom of contract and intervention 257
and give consideration to social inequalities and social problems. 258
Both Taxell and the Draft Legislation Advisory Committee (“Law Council”) have
criticized legislation through preparatory works. 259 One critique is that particular examples and
political preferences expressed in the preparatory works aim to give the courts a limiting
framework. 260 This limiting framework, however, does not bind courts; they can go any way in
deliberations. 261 The framework is only illusory and general clauses vest strong powers with
courts. 262
When the Swedish Government drafted the new Contract Acts, the issue of legislation
through preparatory works was brought to the fore; an open conflict of interest arose concerning
the application of Section 36. Carl Lidbom, the Swedish Attorney General at the time,
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demanded a “modification threshold for terms of contract.” 263 Conversely, the Law Council
made clear that “the principal rule must remain that a contract must be adhered to.” 264
According to the Law Council, the “numerous statements in the travaux preparatoires
[(preparatory works)] involving judgments from the point of view of unfairness were only to be
regarded as examples providing guidance.” 265 With time, these statements would lose their
relevance as public policy changed. 266 Carl Lidbom had the last word, wanting the courts to
change their views: “this clause is designed to encourage the courts to take a different view of
the matters involved here.” 267
On the issue of rights protection, Bernitz has been a strong critic of the protection of
human rights provided for in the Nordic countries. 268 All of the Nordic countries were among
the founding fathers of the European Convention and, formally, their conviction to promote
human rights always has been unquestionable. 269 Nevertheless, the Nordic countries have been
reluctant to implement and incorporate the Convention into national law. Behind this inaction
lies a broad political resistance, especially among social democrats. 270 In Sweden, the ECtHR
was not allowed jurisdiction until 1966, and for many years the European Convention remained
unimplemented. 271 Only in 1995 did Sweden incorporate the Convention into law, although still
with several conditions. 272
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One such condition was that the Social Democrats agreed to incorporate the European
Convention in so far it did not strengthen courts’ power of judicial review. 273 The liberal and
conservative parties agreed to this concession to secure the Social Democrats’ approval to
incorporate the Convention. 274
In addition, the European Convention does not have constitutional status in Sweden
because the Parliament enacted the Convention as a law. Some statements in the preparatory
works to the implementing law of the European Convention establish an interpretation priority
for the Convention and the Swedish Constitution contains a reference to “Sweden’s undertakings
under” the Convention. 275 In principle, however, any subsequently enacted law can take
precedence. 276 The Swedish Parliament and Cabinet retain the power to legislate away the
protection of the European Convention. 277
Not surprisingly, Nordic courts are generally positive toward rights. It was the courts,
especially the Supreme Court, which led the process of strengthening the European Convention
and ECtHR case law in Sweden. 278 In the 1980s, the Supreme Court actively began to interpret
Swedish legislation in accordance with the Convention and ECtHR case law. 279 The Court based
its decisions on “the principle of treaty conform interpretation.” 280 In a case from 1992, the
Supreme Court indicated that the interpretation principle should apply even when the outcome
would be contrary to prior Swedish case law or legislative history. 281
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III.

CONTRACTS LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

The European Union expressed its intention to harmonize contracts law in 1989. In a
resolution from June 1989, the European Parliament (“Parliament”) requested the European
Council, the European Commission (“Commission”), and the Member States to initiate work on
a common European code of private law. 282 No comprehensive measures were actually taken
until July 2001. 283 At that time, the Commission adopted an Action Plan entitled
“Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on European
Contract Law.” 284 The Action Plan aimed to initiate “a process of consultation and discussion
about the way in which problems resulting from divergences between national contract laws in
the EU should be dealt with at the European level.” 285 Specifically, the Communication
intended “to allow the Commission to gather information on the need for more far reaching EU
action in the area of contracts law.” 286 It emphasized several issues: whether cross-border
contracts caused problems to the internal market; whether diverse national contract laws
hindered cross-border transactions; and whether sector-specific harmonization of contracts law
caused inconsistencies. 287
After receiving and considering responses to the first action plan, the Commission
adopted a new action plan in 2003: A More Coherent European Contract Law Action Plan. 288
The new action plan has three aims: “to increase the coherence of the EC acquis in the area of
contract law, to promote the elaboration of EU-wide general contract terms and to examine
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whether to adopt non-sector specific measures such as an optional instrument.” 289 Though the
new action plan dropped the goal of developing a European Contracts Code, there is an
expressed strategy by the Commission to increase harmonization activity in contracts law.
On a practical level, the EU started adopting directives concerning specific areas of
contracts law in 1985. 290 The EC has adopted several directives since 1985. The most relevant
to this article are the Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC), 291 the Directive on Contracts
Negotiated Away from Business Premises (85/577/EEC),292 the Directive on Consumer Credits
(87/102/EEC), 293 the Package Tours Directive (90/314/EEC), 294 the Unfair Contracts Term
Directive (93/13/EC), 295 the Distance Contracts Directive (97/7/EC), 296 the Sale of Consumer
Goods Directive (99/44/EC), 297 and the Directive on Electronic Commerce (2000/31/EC). 298 All
these directives concern particular situations—specific contracts or marketing techniques—that
have been identified as requiring harmonization. 299
These directives aim at leveling out existing disparities between Member States within a
certain area of contracts law. The legal bases used by the EU Legislature to adopt directives are
Article 94 and Article 95 of the Treaty of the European Community (“TEC”). 300 Together these
articles provide the EC Legislature with power to harmonize contracts law in response to
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problems in a market sector relating to trade between Member States; disparate contracts laws
are trade barriers and cause for intervention, the argument goes. 301
The best explanation of the function and limits of Article 95 harmonization is the
Tobacco I decision. 302 Measures based on Article 95 must have as their objective to “improve
the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market.” 303 There also must
be a “finding of disparities between national rules and of the abstract risk of obstacles” to the
fundamental freedoms or the possibility of distortions of competition. 304 Such future obstacles
to trade must be likely to occur and the measure “must be designed to prevent them.” 305
Separate from the above-discussed processes of legislative activity within the realm of
the EU are many private initiatives. The most noteworthy of these initiatives are the Lando
Commission, the Common Core Project, the Social Justice Group, and the Study Group for a
European Civil Code. 306 These initiatives aim to research and promote the understanding of
contemporary contracts law in the different Member States. Some of the initiatives draft
proposals for a European Contracts Code; others try to identify and articulate the general
principles of a future European Contracts Code, lobby their particular agendas to the
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Commission, or work to promote public awareness. 307 The Lando Commission is responsible
for the Principles of European Contract Law (“PECL”). 308 Even though the PECL have no legal
force in and of themselves, they represent an account of European contracts law. Practitioners
and courts often use the PECL as a reference and a source of inspiration. Their authority is
similar to that of the American Restatement in Contract Law. 309
A.

A European Contracts Code
Against this background, the EU is working toward a unified European contracts law.

What concerns this article is the protection of weaker parties in such a future law. There exists
no final law to examine, but by examining various contracts law directives adopted by the
Council, it is possible to predict general principles of a European contracts law. The directive on
unfair contracts terms is the most relevant act to this prediction. Whereas all other contracts law
directives are limited to certain sectors, the Unfair Contract Terms Directive applies to all
contracts between a professional and a consumer. 310 Additionally, the Directive also shares a
similar view of protection of weaker parties with the PECL. 311 From studying the Unfair
Contract Terms Directive, one therefore gets an indication of what legislative techniques and
principles the EU will use to provide for protection of weaker parties in a code. Article 3 is the
article most relevant to the protection of weaker parties in the Directive:
1. A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be
regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a
significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the
contract, to the detriment of the consumer.
2. A term shall always be regarded as not individually negotiated where it has
been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to influence
307
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the substance of the term, particularly in the context of a pre-formulated standard
contract.
The fact that certain aspects of a term or one specific term have been individually
negotiated shall not exclude the application of this Article to the rest of a contract
if an overall assessment of the contract indicates that it is nevertheless a preformulated standard contract.
Where any seller or supplier claims that a standard term has been individually
negotiated, the burden of proof in this respect shall be incumbent on him.
3. The Annex shall contain an indicative and non-exhaustive list of the terms
which may be regarded as unfair. 312
There are two ways to establish a contractual term as being unfair by the use of the
Directive. Paragraph 1 contains a general clause containing criteria of when and how a court
shall deem a contract term unfair. 313 To supplement the general clause, paragraph 3 refers to a
list of unfair terms, found in the annex to the Directive. 314
The general clause, at first glance, seems to provide for a great deal of intervention. This
is, however, deceiving, as its reach is limited to not individually negotiated terms that cause a
significant imbalance, contrary to good faith. 315 First, paragraph 2 defines an individually
negotiated term as a term that one party drafts ahead of time, and which substance the other party
cannot control. 316 By only allowing courts to interfere when a contract is not individually
negotiated, 317 “contracting parties [are free] to conclude the contract which most suits their
particular needs.” 318 The emphasis of this rule is on the principle of freedom of contract and the
virtue of private autonomy in a laissez-faire society. 319 The belief is that “control of individually
negotiated contracts … [is] in conflict with private autonomy and the functioning of a market
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economy.” 320 Courts and other authorities, consequently, only have the power to intervene with
predefined—not individually negotiated—contract terms in standard contracts. 321 Wilhelmsson
observes, “[p]rivate autonomy and freedom of contract… [will] be left untouched as soon as they
have been made use of in some form of negotiation, irrespective of the balance of power of those
taking part in the negotiation.” 322 In sum, the aim of the general clause found in Article 3, and in
a future code, is only to protect the free will of weaker parties, leaving weaker parties on their
own when they have negotiated because those parties have made use of their free will. 323
For a term to be unfair, it must cause a “significant imbalance” between the parties’ rights
and obligations. 324 A similar requirement existed in earlier general clauses in Nordic contracts
laws. For example, before Section 36 of the Swedish Contracts Law Act was adopted, a term
had to be “obviously unfair” before a court could intervene. 325 With the introduction of Section
36, the Swedish legislature deleted the word “obviously.”326 Since then, a term may be unfair if
it merely causes, to use the words of the Directive, imbalance between the parties’ rights and
obligations. Where in this case the EC Directive requires a significant imbalance, it represents a
retreat in attitude concerning intervention. The message given is that courts should abstain from
intervening in contract relations.
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Moreover, the Unfair Contract Terms Directive introduces good faith as a limitation by
requiring any significant imbalance to be “contrary to the requirement of good faith.” 327
Consequently, even though the facts of a case may establish a significant imbalance between the
parties’ rights and obligations, courts’ authority to intervene is constrained by the good faith
principle. 328 One can conclude that intervention in a future code does not aim to promote
equality between the parties.
As a supplement to the general clause, courts can also find a term unfair if it is included
in the list provided for in paragraph 3. It should be noted initially that the language in paragraph
3 is remarkably ambiguous: a self-described “indicative,” “non-exhaustive” list of terms that
“may” be unfair. 329 Yet it is the legislative technique and the origin of this paragraph, and not
poor legislative quality in its drafting, that should draw our attention.
The list is a so-called “gray list.” In Advocate General Geelhoed’s words, a gray list
contains “terms which are presumed to be unfair, but for which the burden of proof is in fact
reversed.” 330 Not every use of a term on the list will cause an imbalance in a contract
relationship. 331 A “black list,” by comparison, includes terms “which are regarded as unfair and
in relation to which courts or competent administrative authorities do not have any discretionary
power.” 332 The EC legislature found inspiration for using such a list from the German Standard
Contracts Act of 1976. 333
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The list has a twofold objective. On one hand, the list aims both to direct and to limit
courts by giving examples of unfair terms. “The list thus offers the courts and other competent
bodies . . . a criterion for interpreting the expression unfair terms.” 334 One fear, expressed by the
Danish legislature among others, is that a list containing specific examples might narrow the
scope of court intervention to such listed terms and decrease the protection already provided for
in general clauses. 335
On the other hand, the list signals to the market what may be acceptable, that is, what is
not categorically prohibited. Because a gray list allows for certain exceptions, market actors will
find ways to use gray-listed terms and courts will be limited in their review of such terms. 336
Effects of such an approach will manifest themselves over time, and despite the amount of
criticism the gray list has received, a future European contracts law likely will include gray lists.
Some Member States, such as Germany, have implemented the list as a binding black list,337
others as an indicative gray list, and some only included the list in the preparatory works of their
law. 338 Furthermore, some Member States use even more restrictive techniques than lists; they
“only allow specific [enumerated] contract clauses to be struck down . . . .” 339
IV.

COMMISSION V. SWEDEN

The historical description of contracts law in the Nordic countries in Part II shows that
there has been a continuous development toward increased protection of weaker parties closely
related to the political and social changes of Nordic society. This development is comprised of
four different periods, to use Wilhelmsson’s terminology: emerging welfarism, reactive
334
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welfarism, maturing welfarism, and person related need-rational welfarism. 340 All four periods
of welfarism coexist and supplement each other today. Person related need-rational welfarism
represents, however, the most recent tendencies within the legal regime of protection of weaker
parties. 341 In addition, Nordic contracts laws deem anyone who is in an inferior position to the
other party as a weaker party; for instance, a consumer or a small business dealer could be a
weaker party.
A future European contracts law, described through this article and through other
scholars’ analyses of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, provides protection of weaker parties
similar on its face to that afforded in the Nordic countries during the period of emerging
welfarism—early twentieth century legislation. 342 Moreover, European contracts law shifts the
standard of who to consider as a weaker party. In the EU, a weaker party is a well-informed and
educated individual. He or she must understand the risks involved in entering a contract, have
the ability to collect information, and be articulate enough to make his or her claims heard. A
weaker party in the EU is thus a market actor
On the surface, the Nordic countries appear to have a much broader system providing for
protection of weaker parties, and therefore, rightfully, they need to make no, or almost no,
changes to existing contracts law in response to EC harmonization efforts. Contracts law
regulations in place provide for similar or better results. This is the reason why many scholars
have connected problems experienced within the Nordic legal systems to the retreat to emerging
welfarism that European contracts law brings about. Thus, these scholars believe that the
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problems within the Nordic legal systems are caused by the decreased protection of weaker
parties. The implementation of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive and the subsequent case,
Commission v. Sweden, however, challenge this perception.
Building on the well-developed tradition of Nordic legal cooperation, the implementation
of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive was a common Nordic effort. The Swedish preparatory
works state:
The effort to transpose the Directive has taken place on a Nordic level. The goal
has been to have a common interpretation of the Directive and establish universal
principles for transposing the Directive domestically. Because regulations on
unfair contract terms are very similar in the Nordic countries, it has been a natural
goal to synchronize transposing measures so that no unnecessary differences
occur. All Nordic countries have been involved, including Iceland. 343
There were three components to the Swedish implementation of the Directive. First, a
revised Consumer Contract Terms Act was enacted. 344 The revised Act conserved significant
portions of the old act but introduced, for instance, an expanded scope of application. 345 Second,
the only change made to Section 36 of the Contracts Act was the introduction of a reference to
the adjustment clause, section 11 of the revised Consumer Contract Terms Act. 346 Finally,
Sweden implemented the list in the annex to the Directive in the preparatory works to the
implementing law. 347
In 1999, the Commission brought Sweden to court for failure to implement the Unfair
Contract Terms Directive. 348 The Commission also, under authority granted to it by Article 226
of the TEC, issued “reasoned opinions . . . against Denmark and Finland for the same reason.” 349
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The EFTA Surveillance Authority expressed that it would take action against Norway if the
Commission prevailed in the case against Sweden. 350 Both Denmark and Finland chose to
intervene in support of Sweden in the proceedings. 351
The Commission argued in its brief to the Court that Sweden must reproduce the list in
the annex in section 3 of Article 3 in the laws implementing the Directive. 352 Specifically, the
Commission said that the Directive has two goals: first, to approximate Member States’
consumer provisions on unfair terms in contracts; and, second, to improve information on
applicable law to consumers. 353 For the Commission, it is necessary to publish the list in law, in
order to achieve the two goals as well as satisfy the requirement of legal certainty. 354 Advocate
General Geelhoed described legal certainty in his opinion to the case: “individuals should have
the benefit of a clear and precise legal situation enabling them to ascertain the full extent of their
rights.” 355 The Commission thus argues that to fulfill these obligations, a “mere mention in the
preparatory work for a law cannot suffice.” 356 It is doubtful whether preparatory works are as
easily accessible as laws are and whether the public is made aware of the existence and
importance of the list through preparatory works. 357
Sweden defended its implementation method, relying in its argument on Article 249 of
the TEC, which grants Member States discretion to choose the form and method of
implementing directives. 358 In making its case, Sweden expressed four reasons why it was a
more “suitable solution” to incorporate the annex into the preparatory works of the implementing
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law. 359 First, “the annex to the Directive … is not in itself intended to create rights and
obligations for individuals.” 360 Advocate General Geelhoed purported this view in his opinion to
the Court; he described the Directive as containing one normative part and one indicative part. 361
Whereas the list is of indicative value and Member States only have to transpose normative
provisions into their legislation, Sweden’s implementation was sufficient.362
Second, in the Nordic countries, preparatory works are one of the main legal sources. 363
By incorporating the list into the preparatory works, the list can be of help when applying and
interpreting the relevant law. 364 Sweden argued to the court:
When the Directive was being implemented, the question of the list in the Annex
was the subject of extensive discussion. According to a legal tradition well
established in Sweden and common to the Nordic countries, the preparatory work
is an important aid to interpreting legislation. The incorporation of the Annex to
the Directive in the preparatory work thus seemed the most suitable solution. 365
Moreover, Swedish legislative texts rarely contain lists of examples. 366 Reiterated in the
preparatory works, the list will be an interpretative source to the adjustment clause.
Third, Swedish courts already had declared fourteen out of the seventeen terms in the
annex unfair at the time the ECJ heard the case. 367 Case law was, therefore, already in harmony
with the Directive. Furthermore, throughout the court proceedings, the Commission could not
give a single example where Sweden had failed to designate a term unfair. 368

359

Id. at 14.
Id. at 13.
361
See Opinion of Mr Advocate General Geelhoed, supra note 330, at para. 36ff.
362
See id. at para. 36.
363
See supra at 219ff.
364
See Opinion of Mr Advocate General Geelhoed, supra note 330, at paras. 49, 51.
365
Case C-478/99, supra note 13, at para. 14.
366
See Opinion of Mr Advocate General Geelhoed, supra note 330, at para. 49.
367
See id. at para. 51.
368
See id. at para. 56.
360

6 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L 235 (2006).

Fourth and finally, “members of the concerned public are informed of … [the list’s]
existence in various ways.” 369 In sum, Sweden argued that whereas Member States only are
obliged to implement directives in a way compatible with their own legal framework, Sweden
had sufficiently implemented the Directive. 370
In its holding, the Court stated that “it is essential that the legal situation resulting from
national implementing measures be sufficiently precise and clear and that individuals be made
fully aware of their rights so that, where appropriate, they may rely on them before the national
courts.” 371 The list in the annex “does not limit the discretion of the national authorities to
determine the unfairness of a term . . .” and “[i]t in no way alters the result sought by the
Directive . . . . It follows that . . . the full effect of the Directive can be ensured in a sufficiently
precise and clear legal framework without” incorporating the list into the implementing
provisions. 372
The court also quoted Advocate General Geelhoed’s opinion:
Inasmuch as the list contained in the Annex to the Directive is of indicative and
illustrative value, it constitutes a source of information both for the national
authorities responsible for applying the implementing measures and for
individuals affected by those measures…. Member States must therefore, in order
to achieve the result sought by the Directive, choose a form and method of
implementation that offer a sufficient guarantee that the public can obtain
knowledge of it. 373
The Swedish Government has claimed that preparatory works are an important interpretative tool
and that they are easily accessible. 374 In relation to implementing the Directive, the Government
asserted that it made the list available to the public in various ways. 375 The Commission failed
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to establish the contrary, and instead, “confined itself to maintaining that those factors cannot
compensate for the fact that . . .” Sweden did not integrate the list in the implementing laws. 376
The Court ruled that the Swedish model of implementation makes individuals sufficiently aware
of their rights, and consequently, Sweden cannot be required to implement the list into law. 377
A.

The Discussion within Sweden
In the preparatory works to the law implementing the Directive, the Swedish Government

discussed different possibilities of implementation. First, the Government identified two positive
effects of incorporating the list in the annex directly into law; such an incorporation would make
the list more easily accessible and would facilitate interpretations of the law in many cases. 378
Nevertheless, where the Directive provides that contract terms in the list “may” be unfair, the
Government concluded that it would be pointless to prescribe the list of contract terms in law if
the terms were not always binding. 379
Second, the Government looked at alternative solutions in implementing the list. One
solution was to change the terms in the list into mandatory terms through prohibiting
exceptions. 380 Such a solution, however, would have made individual review of a contract term
in an individual case impossible. 381 An alternative solution would have been to incorporate the
list into law, but conditioning it. The list would be binding “if no particular circumstances to the
contrary exist.” 382 In that alternative, the list would not give any guidance in complicated
cases. 383 Moreover, such an implementation would have caused misunderstandings. For
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instance, courts might believe that they should avoid considering as unfair contract terms not
included on the list. 384
With these aspects in mind, the Government found that the best solution for
implementing the list into Swedish law was by incorporating the list into the preparatory works
of the implementing law. The Law Faculty Board at the University of Stockholm wrote an
opinion to the proposed draft preparatory works, expressing concern over the risk of courts
overlooking the list if not incorporated into law. 385 Because the Government considered the
reasons against incorporating the list into law predominant, this risk was worth taking. 386
Additionally, the Government noted that the implementing law would be equipped with a direct
reference to the Directive and, as a result, court adjudication would take the Directive into
consideration. 387 In the end, all Nordic countries chose this method of implementation. 388
B.

The Law Council’s Comments
During the implementation process of the Directive, the Swedish Government requested

the Law Council to comment on the draft for the new law. 389 In its comment, the Law Council
recognized the special legal character of the list and pointed to several features.
First, Swedish tradition dictates that the Government should enact into law lists
containing recommendations that purport to bring about a uniform application or assist in
forming future case law—like the list of the annex. 390 In this case, the Government, therefore,
could not rightfully claim that the list has been “incorporated into Swedish Law.” 391
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Second, where the preparatory works to the implementing law incorporates the list, a
court cannot use the list as an interpreting factor when applying the relevant section concerning
unfair contract terms; in Swedish legislation, the clause relating to unfair terms is Section 36 of
the Contracts Act. 392 When assessing possibly unfair terms under Section 36, therefore courts
only will consider the preparatory works to Section 36 itself. When implementing the Directive,
however, the only change made to Section 36 of the Contracts Act was the incorporation of a
reference to the assessment provisions of the implementing law. 393
In Marleasing SA v. La Commercial International de Alimentacion SA, the ECJ decided
that courts must interpret national law in accordance with EC law. 394 This means that Swedish
courts are obligated to include the Directive as an interpreting factor when applying Section
36. 395 The result is that the list will have sufficient impact, though not because of its
incorporation into the preparatory works of the implementing law.
Third, the Law Council agreed with the Government that the terms in the list are vague
and for many reasons are not suitable for legislating. 396 Finally, it is most likely that Courts
would already hold the terms included on the list unfair by application of Section 36. 397
C.

Remarks on the Discussion of Commission v. Sweden
From the Nordic legislatures’ perspective, there is no question that Nordic contracts laws

materially fulfilled the implementation requirements of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 398
After all, the Directive caused little disturbance in Nordic contracts laws—largely because the
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laws in place already contained well-developed legislation and case law that provided for
equivalent results. The legislatures’ argument was that the Directive was redundant. The
concepts of individually negotiated terms, significant imbalance, and good faith already were
well established in the Nordic countries. In fact, the Nordic countries considered themselves
leaders in providing for protection in line with these concepts.
The list was different by virtue of the legislative technique used; Sweden had to transpose
it into Swedish law in one way or another. Transposing the list into the preparatory works
allowed the legislature to retain its control while also implementing the list. The legislature was
well aware that its implementation model was borderline insufficient; not only did it comment on
this possible insufficiency in its internal discussion, but also the critique from the Law Council
recognized it. Moreover, Sweden had notice from precedent; when Denmark tried to implement
a directive into a preparatory works in 1985, the Commission brought Denmark to the ECJ for
failure to implement the directive and the ECJ found against Denmark. 399 In Commission v.
Sweden, the ECJ distinguished its reasoning from the Danish case on the grounds that the list of
presumptively unfair terms only provided information to private citizens and did not create any
rights or duties by itself. 400
The analysis of the Nordic implementation of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive
suggests that the Commission was right. Although Nordic contracts laws many times provide for
outcomes similar to that required by the Directive, it is only through the interpretative obligation,
as reaffirmed by the ECJ in Marleasing, that a party can rely on, or the courts can give full effect
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to the Directive in adjudication. 401 Commission v. Sweden thus visualized a dilemma between
the Nordic countries and the EU institutions.
V.

ANALYSIS AND NORDIC LEGAL DEBATE

Part I of this article laid out Kennedy’s theory of globalizations of law and legal thought,
comprised of Classical Legal Thought, The Social, and the Third Globalization. Kennedy’s
theory gave a global perspective that this article used to analyze the historical and current Nordic
legal debate.
The Nordic countries received Classical Legal Thought at the end of the nineteenth
century and during the early years of the twentieth century. Nordic contracts laws from this
period were filled with freedom of contract features, and protection of weaker parties was limited
to secure each party’s will.
Next, until the 1970s, The Social heavily influenced legal forces in the Nordic countries,
allowing parliamentary supremacy, social conceptualism, and corporatism to prosper. Contracts
law during this period shaped a wide-ranging regime of welfarism; this period saw the
emergence of informalities, strong biases for welfare considerations, and contracts rules laden
with paternalist motives. Another important element from this period for the current Nordic
legal debate was the emergence of Scandinavian realism, which first played an important role in
democratizing law-making in the Nordic countries and later was a dominant factor in the
enthusiastic reception of The Social in the Nordic countries.
When the Third Globalization, comprised of policy analysis and neo-formalism, evolved,
the Nordic legal systems, heavily inspired by The Social, had no trouble in receiving policy
analysis. Part II of this article laid out how case law had established the proportionality
principle, and how Section 36 of the Contract Acts made a prima facie case of policy analysis
401
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legislation. However, neo-formalism met strong resistance in the Nordic countries and gained
strength only through European integration, primarily through the Nordic countries’ accession to
the EU. For example, Sweden partly introduced federalism and judicial supremacy through the
EC Treaty and the acquis communautaire when joining the EU in 1995; Sweden’s
implementation of the different directives on contracts law reintroduced freedom of contracts and
formalism; and Sweden incorporated the ECtHR—property rights and human rights—into law in
1995.
Although parts of neo-formalism have been introduced to the Nordic legal systems,
incorporation of those parts is at best incomplete and is generally insufficient. The reason for
this is that the Nordic countries claim redundant the legal influences coming with neo-formalism
and, specifically, European contracts law. In Part III and Part IV, the article outlined the present
Nordic mind-set toward European contracts law. Where Part III explored the contents of a
European contracts law and highlighted differences in relation to Nordic contracts laws, Part IV
illustrated how the Nordic countries implemented the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, how they
argued, in Commission v. Sweden that the Directive was redundant to Nordic contracts laws, and
how they insufficiently implemented the Directive. My discussion in Part IV, however, shows
that neither the Unfair Contract Terms Directive nor neo-formalism is redundant.
Neo-formalism causes many disturbances to the Nordic legal systems. First, neoformalism re-establishes coherence within the legal system, from which one can deduce rights,
and grants courts the power to protect rights—in this case, freedom of contracts, but also
property rights and human rights—in contrast to the earlier prevailing order of an informal
parliamentary-made regime of collective welfare. Second, neo-formalism introduces a federal
level of governance with powers to decide policy, specifically, the Commission and the ECJ, and
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removes policy-making powers from the former sovereign Member States. Third, with neoformalism the judiciary is supreme and, thus, takes the place of parliaments. Because European
contracts law represents part of the reception of neo-formalism in the Nordic countries, it
requires Nordic legal institutions to subject themselves to a new balance of formal powers.
Arguably, the claim that harmonization of contracts law decreases protection of weaker
parties stems from the assumption in the Nordic countries that their contracts law is more social
in the law of the market and this claim is employed by the Nordic countries to resist, and to
justify resistance of, European contracts law. Resistance takes place as Nordic legal institutions
strive to preserve the Nordic legal systems’ informal and arbitrary characteristics whenever they
are incorporating EC legislation or ECJ case law. Indeed, this mind-set is prevalent everywhere
in Nordic legal debate. All arguments and claims originate from the presumption that the Nordic
legal systems embody social welfare, intervention, and informality (“social”); whereas the EU
stands for economic liberalism, deregulation, and formalism (“liberalism”). Political biases
determine the positions and arguments made at each side of the social versus liberalism
dichotomy.
Here follows a summary of the dichotomy within Nordic debate, though it is not an
attempt to be comprehensive.
A.

Social
At the social side of the dichotomy, one can summarize the arguments as a strong

preference for informal and wide-ranging Nordic legislation over formal and stagnated EC
legislation. First, looking at how legal debate views the Nordic legal systems, the Swedish
Government argued in Commission v. Sweden that the Unfair Contracts Term Directive was
redundant. The Government claimed that Swedish law already held the terms in the list in the
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annex to the Directive unfair. Advocate General Geelhoed supported that claim by stating that
Swedish case law already had declared fourteen out of the seventeen terms in the annex unfair
and, more interestingly, the Commission could not give a single example where Sweden had
failed to designate a term unfair. 402 All these arguments presume that the Nordic legal systems,
which are flexible and dynamic and which give judges broad powers to balance and intervene in
cases, already provide for every possible adjudicative outcome. Whether it is rights, principles,
or judicial supremacy, the system in place can secure the same outcome as a formal system and,
at the same time, be flexible. If this should prove insufficient, the argument goes, the legislature
can always intervene to supplement or correct legislation.
Second, what is most striking about the image of the EU at the social side of the
dichotomy is the great fear of neo-liberal ideology. The Nordic countries have a long tradition of
intervention and social purposes. Scholars are concerned that once the EU has harmonized
contracts law, initiatives could only come through the cumbersome democratic process of the
EU. 403 Harmonization of contracts law means that any area covered by EC laws “would be
removed from the powers of the national states,” because EC law is supreme over Member State
law. 404 Member State legislatures thus will no longer have policymaking powers or power to
respond to socio-economic changes. 405 Whereas European contracts law is enacted to promote
ideas such as trade, market economy, and efficiency, there will be no room for social welfare
concerns.
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A third concern is the conflict between a uniform European contracts law and the idea of
welfarism, because welfarism is not a single idea around which one can construct a code 406 and
is not reducible to a single coherent formula. 407 Rather, welfarism requires a combination of
various welfarist regulations. 408 Wilhelmsson explains: “one needs to take a stand on various
questions on an issue-by-issue and case-by-case basis. The variety . . . implies that the
solutions[, or rules,] are necessarily too political, too decisionistic, to be carved out in stone once
and for all.” 409 Welfarism requires a “continuous experimental development and improvement .
. . where new ideas not only flow via EC legislation, but also directly between the Member
States.” 410 Logically, this is impossible if a uniform European contracts law controls contracts in
the EU; hence, legal development would stagnate under European contracts law. 411 Any
measures taken on a European level of government must therefore leave “sufficient room for
continuous development at a national level.” 412
Fourth, another common perception about European contracts law is that because all
Member States within the EU, to some extent, have different legal cultures, one will have to
search for common values on which to base a contracts law. 413 The regime of protection of
weaker parties in Nordic contracts laws has been “connected with the relatively homogeneous
[welfarist] values of those able to influence them.” 414 Among the different Member States in the
EU, however, there are no homogeneous social values to build upon, but rather, a multitude of
406
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different social groups and conflicting interests. 415 A European contracts law therefore will be a
race to find common traditional values. 416 An aggravating factor is the “natural tendency …
[among] governmental experts to defend the positions of their own legal systems and the
consequent need to search for compromise solutions.” 417 In sum, Nordic legal debate perceives
European contracts law to be very abstract, construed out of concepts, and containing no
homogenous welfarist idea. 418
Finally, whereas the legal basis for EC legislation is trade barriers caused by disparities in
Member States’ legislation, EC legislation necessarily will disrupt the flexible and interventionist
system in place and will cause great insecurity. In the case of European contracts law, it will
replace over 100 years of case law. 419 EC law codification hence implies a shift from “judgemade law to black-letter statutes.” 420 It “took [Nordic] judges and legal theorists decades to
build up the progressive, flexible and pragmatic system of today,” 421 all of which will be
exchanged for European contracts law. Although, most importantly, given the need for uniform
application, it is unavoidable that the ECJ bears the sole responsibility for ensuring legal
development. 422 Harmonization thus strips Member State courts of their powers. Swedish
Supreme Court Judge Torgny Håstad explains that if national courts are left in charge of
developing case law, there is a great risk that disparities in application will once again
develop. 423 Bigger countries also would likely influence case law more than smaller countries
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because they have more cases. 424 The only solution for a free market is to leave it to the ECJ to
take on the role of norm creator and supreme judiciary.
B.

Liberalism
On the liberalism side of the dichotomy, Nordic debate focuses on how European

“formal” legislation can increase the wealth and growth of the market, in combination with a
strong critique of the existing “informal” Nordic legal systems.
First, to achieve an efficient and working market, one needs a European contracts law
with uniform rules. 425 Member States’ contracts law is too interventionist and too disparate for
businesses. Only with a uniform law can market actors adopt business routines applicable
indiscriminately throughout the EU. 426 In the words of Ole Lando:
The Union is an economic community. Its purpose is the free flow of goods,
persons, services and capital. The idea is that the more freely and more
abundantly these can move across the frontiers, the wealthier and happier we will
become. All of these move by way of contracts. It should, therefore, be made
easier to conclude and perform contracts and calculate contract risks. 427
Second, the EU allows for highly technical and efficient solutions in comparison to local
Nordic legislation. With European contracts law, there exist increased possibilities to entertain
the demands of trade and economy. 428 Lando explains: “[c]ontract law is not folklore. It is a
question of ethics, economics and technique.” 429 As a conclusion, it must follow that one could
draft a contracts law with “common principles favorable for the economy and technically
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expedient.” 430 To sum up, European contracts law is a project of democracy, market economy,
and Christian ethics and, therefore, a plausible and desirable goal. 431
Third, Nordic legal debate often refers to EC law as strengthening legal certainty. Under
a system of rule of law, individuals must know and must be able to rely on the legal
consequences that will result from their actions. A harmonized system of rules such as a
European contracts law will increase legal certainty because market actors will no longer run the
risk of having different Member States’ rules apply to similar contracts. Stig Strömholm gives
an illustrative description: “People living inside the EU shall be able to rely on the legal
framework surrounding the Union, foresee the legal effects of their actions, and have the
freedom of choice to enter into dispositions.” 432 The enactment of a European contracts law will
improve legal certainty for consumers and businesses as these parties increasingly take part in
cross-border trade. 433
Fourth, the EU minimizes state intervention in the market to predefined exceptions. In
short, neo-liberals believe that intervention causes more disturbance than good for the market
and, hence, the state shall avoid intervening. Not only does the market have to be protected from
intervention, but so do individuals; protection is necessary to secure the free enjoyment of
individual rights. Rights like freedom of contract and the right to property are sacred. Implicit
in this claim, European contracts law embodies the principle of freedom of contract and allows
only for clear and foreseeable exceptions. In his article, Swedish Standard Contracts Law and
the EC Directive on Contract Terms, Bernitz emphasizes the importance of limiting paternalistic
430
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court intervention. 434 Any social concerns or protective measures should be contained to
specific problem areas. 435 The best way to achieve this is with mandatory rules regulating such
problem areas. 436 Whereas the principal consumer protection goal is information to consumers
in EC contracts law, 437 the EU reproduces the image of minimized court intervention.
Fifth, because EC law will use standardized models for finding solutions to conflicts,
court deliberation on a case-by-case basis will decrease. 438 In his book, Avtalsrätt, Lars Erik
Taxell foresees that formalism will increase with a European Contracts Code. 439 EC Directives
might very well already have initiated this process. Concerning the “gray list” in the Unfair
Contract Terms Directive, Bernitz identifies a possible shift in court deliberation from an
individualized assessment to a more “clause-oriented” assessment of contracts. 440 The focus of
assessment thus will be on specific contract clauses, not the individual circumstances of the
case. 441 With time, Bernitz believes this will increase the efficacy of the system.442
VI.

CONCLUSION

Because of the social versus liberalism dichotomy and its presumptions about the EU and
the Nordic legal systems, Nordic legal institutions have resisted European contracts law and have
mitigated the disturbances caused by it. Formal issues of institutional competences have been
blurred into substantive issues of policy and, thus, allowed the Nordic countries to avoid the
legal choices coming with European contracts law.
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For instance, in the case of protection of weaker parties, Nordic legal institutions mitigate
the consequences of European contracts law by claiming that harmonization decreases
protection. In making this claim, legal institutions transform the issue of which institution has
the formal power to legislate and decide contracts law policy—the EC legislature or the Member
States’ legislatures—to one of substance. Specifically, the issue becomes who has the best
policy and what is the substantive outcome of such a shift to European contracts law.
The claim presumes that Nordic contracts laws are better as informal and paternalistic.
The true concern of Nordic legal institutions is resistance to giving up legislative powers to the
EU and, in contrast to what one might believe, Nordic legal institutions are not concerned with
what will happen with protection of weaker parties.
Through a perspective of globalization of law and legal thought, this article lays out how
harmonization of contracts law represents part of the reception of the ongoing globalization in
the Nordic countries. The perspective helps to identify and trace disturbances coming with
European integration, in this case, to the Nordic legal systems.
Moreover, this perspective allows for a brief prediction of what is to come. On the one
hand, the Nordic countries are likely to experience an increased amount of cases and reasoned
opinions against themselves. This will arise from their non-implementation of EC Directives,
the fact they do not recognize principles and rights established by ECJ case law, and the
perception that their continued use of informal criteria creates barriers to the free movement of
goods, services, people, and capital. On the other hand, this analysis suggests that European
contracts law will not cause protection of weaker parties to decrease. Rather, European contracts
law leaves ample space for the development of far-reaching consumer protective measures.
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